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INDIANA LABOR RELATIONS LAW: THE CASE FOR A STATE
LABOR RELATIONS ACT
JULIUS G. GETMAN-
I. THE ROLE OF STATE LABOR LAW
The enactment of the NLRA' greatly reduced the role of the states
in labor relations. With certain limited exceptions, the National Labor
Relations Board was granted jurisdiction over any business which "af-
fects commerce."2  It was soon clear that almost all enterprises come
within this jurisdictional grant.3 Thus, it became necessary for the courts
to delineate the scope of permissible state regulation over businesses which
were also subject to the federal act. In Hill v. Florida,4 the Supreme
Court held that state laws which interfered with federally-protected rights
were invalid. This still left considerable scope for state authority, be-
cause the Wagner Act did not regulate union activity and it was generally
understood that state competence continued in this area. With the pas-
sage of the Taft-Hartley amendments, however, the federal government
undertook to regulate union activity and the role of the states was further
reduced, particularly as the Court soon thereafter invalidated state regula-
tion of activity prohibited by federal law.' Moreover, if it was unclear
whether the matter was subject to federal jurisdiction, the determination
was for the National Labor Relations Board and not for the states. As
Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated in the leading case of San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon :G
' Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University.
This article had its origins in a report for the legislative study committee on a labor
relations act prepared by the Labor Law Seminar at the Indiana University School of
Law (Bloomington) in 1966. Thus each member of the seminar in some measure aided
in the preparation of this article. Richard Johnson and Thomas McCully had primary
responsibility within the seminar in researching the Indiana law. Both Mr. McCully,
now an attorney in Lafayette, Indiana, and Mr. Johnson, a third-year law student, did
additional research to assist me in preparing this article. For their valuable aid I am
extremely grateful. They are absolved of any responsibility for the suggestions con-
tained herein.
1. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964).
2. National Labor Relations Act §§ 9, 10, 49 Stat. 453 (1935), added by 61 Stat.
146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1964).
3. Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 647 (1944) ; NLRB v. Fainblatt,
306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939).
4. 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
5. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) ; Planlinton Packing Co. v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 255 Wis. 285, 38 N.W.2d 688 (1949), aff'd mer.
338 U.S. 953 (1950).
6. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities
which a State purports to regulate are protected by §7 of the
Taft-Hartley Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under
§8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state
jurisdiction must yield. . . . When activity is arguably subject
to §7 or §8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts
must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor
Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national
policy is to be averted.'
Since it is possible to argue with some plausibility that almost any labor
relations conduct is either protected or outlawed under the federal act,
the area of pre-emption thus marked out was very great. And the
Garmon decision also made clear that even where it could be established
that conduct was neither outlawed nor protected under the federal act,
state law might be pre-empted on the theory that such regulation by the
state was inconsistent with the scheme of the federal act.'
The broad jurisdiction of the NLRA together with the strict rules
on pre-emption meant that comprehensive state labor relations laws were
impractical, since their operation would be so limited as to make them
useless. It is true that there have always been exceptions to the doctrine
of federal pre-emption, but initially these exceptions did not afford a
basis for general legislation.
7. Id. at 244.
8. Prior to the Garmon decision the Court indicated that states could regulate activi-
ties neither protected nor prohibited by the federal act. In UAW v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949) (Briggs & Stratton), the union used intermit-
tent work stoppages and similar economic pressures. The Wisconsin Employment Re-
lations Board granted an injunction and the Supreme Court affirmed its jurisdiction.
The Court held that the activity, being neither protected nor outlawed under the federal
act, was subject to state jurisdiction. The validity of the holding and the extent to
which this case may be used as a source of state legislative power is questionable. This
decision came before Garnon and similar cases which established the full scope of fed-
eral pre-emption, and its language suggests a greater role for state law than does that
of the latter decisions. Accordingly "it appears to be a doubtful basis for state com-
petence over unprohibited and unprotected conduct." Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Can-
gress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations, 59 COLUm. L. REV. 6, 17 (1959).
Moreover, the Court has expanded the concept of protected activity under § 7, NLRB
v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962), and has also stressed the significant
role under the federal scheme of economic pressure of the type involved in Briggs &
Stratton. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 492 (1960). Thus
it is unlikely that the Briggs & Stratton case would be decided the same way today and
it would be hazardous to utilize this holding as a source of state power.
9. Thus in UAW v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954), state laws regu-
lating violence were not invalidated because of the strong and traditional local concern
with this matter. This precedent has recently been applied to permit the applicability of
state labor law to conduct which is arguably protected by the federal act See Linn v.
United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966). Also state regulation of internal
union affairs was permitted because the NLRA did not regulate in this area. See In-
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By the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act, Congress at-
tempted to provide a way by which state jurisdiction could be exercised
generally over matters which the Board chose not to regulate. Because
of the breadth of its statutory authority the Board had found it necessary
to decline to exercise its jurisdiction in certain cases. In 1950 the Board
established jurisdictional standards which set minimum dollar amounts
which had to be met before the Board would exercise jurisdiction over
certain types of cases.' By virtue of subsection 10(a), added by the
Taft-Hartley Act, the Board was "empowered by agreement to cede jur-
isdiction" to state agencies where the state statute was not inconsistent
with the NLRA. The purpose of subsection 10(a) was to increase state
jurisdiction over labor relations. Its impact was precisely the reverse.
Because of the requirement of consistency between federal and state law
the Board was "unable to consummate any such agreements." And in
Guss v. Utah Labor Bd." the Supreme Court held that the procedure
established by subsection 10 (a) was "the exclusive means whereby states
may be enabled to act concerning the matters which Congress has en-
trusted to the National Labor Relations Board."' 2 The NLRA was held
to preclude state jurisdiction even where the Board declined to act. Thus,
employers and employees in businesses affecting commerce which did not
meet the Board's jurisdictional standards were left totally without
protection.
To correct this problem, Congress in 1959 added subsection 14(c),
which authorized the Board to continue to decline jurisdiction over cases
in industries where the impact on commerce was not sufficiently substan-
tial. Subsection 14(c) (2) provided that the states could assume jur-
isdiction in such cases. Thus since 1959 the area of permissible state
ternational Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958). Although internal
union affairs are now subject to federal control under the Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1964), state regulation is still
permitted under § 103 of that act. As noted, these exceptions do not provide authority
for comprehensive regulation of labor-management relations. The first two merely
permit the state to apply primarily non-labor statutes to labor relations situations. The
third permits regulation of employee-union relations rather than labor-management
relations.
Similarly limited state regulation is permitted by § 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act
which authorizes states to prohibit union security agreements otherwise authorized by
§ 8(a) (3) of the NLRA.
10. Hollow Tree Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 635, 636 (1950). These standards were
changed in 1954 and 1958. See Siemons Mailing Serv., 122 N.L.R.B. 81 (1958). Under
current standards the Board declines jurisdiction over retail enterprises which have a
gross volume of business of less than $500,000 per annum and over local transit systems
with a gross volume of business of less than $250,00 per year. For further examples
see Dmsiox OF INFo ATIoN, N.L.R.B.: JURISDICTIONAL GUIDE 4, 7 (available from.
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.).
11. 353 U.S. 1 (1956).
12. Id. at 9.
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regulation has been considerably enlarged.
The enactment of subsection 14(c) (2) is one of the major reasons
for the resurgence of interest in state labor laws." The other major
reason is the growing concern with collective bargaining in public service
employment. Public employees have been excluded from the coverage of
the NLRA since its inception, and it has been understood that states could
legislate with respect to state and local public employees. But until re-
cently it was generally thought that labor relations statutes were inappro-
priate for public employees. This assumption is being subjected to in-
creasingly critical analysis today.
Indeed, the applicability of collective bargaining in the public service
has become the most discussed issue in labor relations law.'4 There are
many reasons for this sudden burst of interest. The number of public
employees, particularly at the state and local levels, has grown dramati-
cally and at a pace much faster than that of employees in private indus-
try. 5 This dramatic growth, together with the fact that the labor move-
ment has already organized or tried to organize most significant employee
groups in private industry, has made public employees an inviting target
for union organization. Salaries for public employees have not kept pace
with those in private industry.'6 Job dissatisfaction has risen, and public
employees have become more responsive to the arguments of union organ-
izers. As a result, during recent years, while union membership in private
industry has declined slightly, union membership among public employees
has increased rapidly.'
The growth in union organization was accompanied by a change in
public and professional attitudes toward the concept of collective bargain-
ing in public service. The assumption that collective bargaining was in-
appropriate in the public sector was based partly on the peculiar nature of
government service." It became more difficult to accept as government
service expanded and the nature of the work done by government em-
13. See, e.g., Smith & Clark, Reappraisal of the Role of the States in Shaping La-
bor Relations Law, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 410.
14. See, e.g., Collective Bargaining in the Public Service [Proceedings of the 1966
Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association (Somers ed.)] ; Note,
40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 606, 628-54 (1965) ; Note, Labor Relations in the Public Service,
75 tHARv. L. REv. 391 (1962) ; Anderson, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 12 LAB.
L.J. 1069 (1961); Weisenfeld, Public Employees-First or Second Class Citizens, 16
LAB. L.J. 685 (1965).
15. Weisenfeld, supra note 14, at 687-88.
16. Note, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 75 HARV. L. REv. 391, 409 n.111
(1961).
17. Smith & Clark, supra note 13, at 422-23.
18. See Note, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 628, 632-36 (1965).
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ployees became more like that done by employees in private industry.'9
Moreover, concepts about the nature of collective bargaining also changed.
At one time collective bargaining was thought of as a process concerned
almost entirely with raising wages and shortening hours. Since these
matters were set by law in the public service, there was nothing about
which public employees and management could bargain. But in recent
years we have become increasingly aware of the importance of collective
bargaining in providing orderly procedures for resolving industrial dis-
putes and protecting employees from arbitrary exercises of power by their
superiors, -0 functions which collective negotiation in the public service
can perform. Thus scholars began increasingly to dispute the notion that
collective bargaining was inappropriate in the public service at the same
time that union organization and employee dissatisfaction were grow-
ing.2 Considerable agitation developed for the recognition by the law of
the appropriateness of collective negotiation in public service.
This agitation was first manifested on the federal level, where there
existed a long tradition of organization among postal employees. 2 2  The
agitation bore fruit in the promulgation of Executive Order 10988.23
This order, issued by President John F. Kennedy and reaffirmed by
President Lyndon B. Johnson, provided for a system of union recogni-
tion and collective negotiation in the federal service. It was inevitable
that acceptance of the principle of collective negotiation on the federal
level would lead to increased demands for such recognition on the state
and local level, and such agitation has in fact occurred.22
19. Ibid. See also A.B.A., Section of Labor Relations Law, Report of the Com-
mittee on Labor Relations of Governmental Employees 89-90 (1955).
20. "A major achievement of collective bargaining, perhaps its most important con-
tribution to the American workplace, is the creation of a system of industrial jurispru-
dence, a system under which employer and employee rights are set forth in contractual
form and disputes over the meaning of the contract are settled through a rational
grievance process. . . . The gains from this system are especially noteworthy because
of their effect on the recognition and dignity of the individual worker." INDEPENDENT
STUDY GROUP, THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN NATIONAL LABOR PoLicy 32 (1961). See gen-
erally PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL
SERVICE (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1961).
21. Weisenfeld, supra note 14, at 688; Smith & Clark, supra note 13, at 421-36.
22. See HART, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL SERvICE 2 (1965).
23. Exec. Order No. 10988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (1962).
24. By virtue of § 6(b) of Executive Order No. 10988 an employee organization
"designated or selected by a majority of the employees" is entitled to "exclusive recog-
nition" which gives it the right inter alia to act for and negotiate agreements covering
all employees in the unit. These agreements are, however, limited to personnel policies.
They do not deal with wages or hours and they are required to include an extremely
broad management prerogative clause. See § 7 of the order. The order was further
supplemented by "Standards of Conduct for Employees Organizations" and "Code of
Fair Labor Practices," 28 Fed. Reg. 5127-32 (1963).
25. See Weisenfeld, supra note 14, at 693.
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II. RECENT EFFORTS TO ENACT LABOR LEGISLATION IN INDIANA
In Indiana, as elsewhere, agitation for collective bargaining rights
in the public sector, together with the increased jurisdiction of states in
the private sector has led organized labor to seek passage of a compre-
hensive labor relations statute. Indeed the matter has been given top
priority by the state AFL-CIO. 6 In 1965 a state labor relations bill
was introduced in the legislature but was not finally acted upon." In-
stead the legislature appointed a committee that was instructed "to con-
duct a study concerning a State Labor Relations Act and to prepare
recommendations to be submitted to the 95th Session of the Indiana Gen-
eral Assembly in order to give all workers in Indiana the right of due
process through collective bargaining and representative elections.12 ' The
committee, chaired by Professor D. W. Murphy of Indiana University,
was composed of ten members representing labor, management, and the
public. 9
After holding numerous meetings and hearings throughout the
State, the committee issued majority and minority reports. The majority
report concluded that "there is need for legislation in the State of Indiana
to provide all workers in Indiana the right of due process through collec-
tive bargaining and representative elections."2 " It recommended that a
bill similar to the original Wagner Act be drafted covering almost all em-
ployees in the State, including those employed by the State. The majority
report did not deal with questions of language or organization, and it did
not describe the legislation which it recommended except in the most gen-
eral terms. A strong dissenting report was issued by the management
representatives on the committee.2 ' They concluded that the "need for a
state labor relations act has not been demonstrably proven by sufficient
evidence .... " The minority report, while unfavorable to any labor
26. Resolution of AFL-CIO Convention (Oct. 1966), on file at the Indiana Law
Journal office.
27. Because of the speed with which it was drafted, the bill contained many tech-
nical errors. The author and the Labor Law Seminar of the Indiana University Law
School (Bloomington) were involved in trying to correct these errors but adequate time
was not available. The bill never reached the level of draftsmanship worthy of passage.
Its rejection was, in part at least, attributable to this fact.
28. IND. H.R. CON. RES. 35, pursuant to Ind. Acts 1965, ch. 479, § 1.
29. The committee members, in addition to the chairman, were Cliff Arden, Paul
Boyle, Representatives Dawson and MacDonald, Frank McAllister, Senators Rybolt and
Yeagley, Louis Tiedge, and Max Wright.
30. Indiana General Assembly, Report of State Labor Relations Act Study Com-
mittee 3 (1966) (hereinafter cited Report), on file at the Indiana Law Journal office.
31. Members Rybolt, McAllister, MacDonald, and Tiedge.
32. Indiana General Assembly, Minority Report of State Labor Relations Act Study
Committee 1 (1966) (hereinafter cited Minority Report), on file at the Indiana Law
Journal office.
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relations act, was particularly critical of the recommendation that the
proposed act be extended to public employees. While the minority report
was a highly partisan document, it did at least offer some reasons to sup-
port its conclusions. The majority report did not. It announced conclu-
sions without supporting evidence or reasons. Further, the majority
avoided dealing with difficult issues about the nature of the bill proposed.
The need for a labor relations act may largely be demonstrated by
an analysis of existing state law. As will be shown below there is no
effective machinery for implementing the announced public policy of the
State favoring free employee choice. Indiana labor law as it currently
operates does not effectively promote the peaceful settlement of indus-
trial disputes. As a result the arguments against a state act are un-
persuasive so long as the act in question is a fair one recognizing equally
the legitimate interests of labor, management, and the public.
III. INDIANA LABOR LAW TODAY
The Rights of Employees i thw Private Sector
Union activity has been declared legal in Indiana since 1905. In
Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers,"3 Mr. Justice Had-
ley speaking for the court affirmed the legality of union organization and
strike activity. Although the legality of the right to strike has not been
challenged since 1905, its free exercise was severely hampered during the
early part of the twentieth century by the trial courts' promiscuous grant-
ing of anti-strike injunctions. In Indiana, as elsewhere, it was not uncom-
mon for temporary restraining orders to issue against strike action which
was legal under state law. 4 The ultimate vindication of the right to
strike in such situations did not undo the damage caused by the initial
injunction. This and other abuses led to a national campaign to limit the
use of injunctions in labor disputes" which after years of effort was
finally successful. In 1932 Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act,".
which became the prototype for anti-injunction statutes in many states.
In 1933 Indiana passed a statute which is an exact copy of the federal
statute.3
7
33. 165 Ind. 421, 75 N.E. 877 (1905).
34. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. Jordan, 184 Ind. 499, 111 N.E. 622 (1916) ; National
Bhd. of Operative Potters v. City of Kokomo, 211 Ind. 27, 5 N.E.2d 634 (1937). On
the uses and abuses of the labor injunction in labor litigation see FRANKFURTER &
GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
35. See TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERIcAN HISTORY 414-15 (1964).
36. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
37. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-501 to -513 (Burns 1965 Repl.). For a discussion of
the background of the Indiana statute see WITNEY, INDIANA LABOR RELATIONS LAw 27
(1960).
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The purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and its Indiana counter-
part was to promote free employee choice by limiting the role of the
courts in labor disputes. The Indiana anti-injunction statute:
(1) reaffirmed that the public policy of the State was to permit free
choice by employees with respect to union activity,"8
(2) made illegal the enforcement of so-called "yellow dog con-
tracts," whereby an employee agreed not to join a union,"9
(3) forbade-the issuance of ex parte injunctions in labor disputes,"
(4) established rigid substantive and procedural requirements which
had to be met before an injunction could be issued in a labor dispute,41
and
(5) limited the scope of injunctions which could be issued after
these requirements were met.42
The impact of the statute has been somewhat minimized by the In-
diana courts' conclusion that strikes for an unlawful purpose may be en-
joined. 3 The question of what constitutes an unlawful purpose has con-
tinued to raise difficulties. In general the Indiana courts have taken the
position that attempts by a union to interfere with the statutory policy of
free employee choice are unlawful. Thus attempts to compel an employer
38. IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-502 (Burns 1965 Repl.).
39. IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-503 (Burns 1965 Repl.).
40. IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-508 (Burns 1965 Repl.).
41. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-504 to -510 (Burns 1965 Repl.). Indiana courts have
tended on occasion to overlook some of the procedural requirements when injunctions
were otherwise appropriate. See, e.g., Murrin v. Cook Bros. Dairy, 127 Ind. App. 23,
138 N.E.2d 907 (1956).
42. IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-504 (Burns 1965 Repl.).
43. Roth v. Local 1460, Retail Clerks Union, 216 Ind. 363, 24 N.E.2d 280 (1939);
Fair Share Organization v. Metnick, 134 Ind. App. 675, 188 N.E.2d 840 (1963).
In the Roth case the court did not seek to justify its conclusion that strikes of this
type are enjoinable under the statute. The court simply concluded without analysis that
since the strike was contrary to the policy of free choice outlined in the statute it was
enjoinable.
The language of § 504 and § 507 of the Indiana anti-injunction statute indicates
that peaceful picketing even for an unlawful purpose cannot be enjoined. Strikes of this
type come within the definition of "labor dispute" in § 513, and § 504 forbids the issu-
ance of any injunction prohibiting, e.g., "Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts
involved in, any labor dispute . . ." or of "Assembling peaceably to act or to organize
to act in promotion of their interests in a labor dispute...." Section 507 requires that
certain findings be made before an injunction may be issued on any labor dispute, e.g.,
"That the public officer charged with the duty to protect complainant's property are [is]
unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection." These findings are irrelevant if
injunctions may be issued against peaceful picketing. Thus the Indiana courts permit
injunctions for the type of activity protected by § 504 without regard to the findings
required by § 507. So long as individual judges in advance of a final determination
may prohibit picketing on the basis of their independent evaluation of its legality, the
dangers of the type of abuses which lead to enactment of the statute still exist. See
FRANKFURTER & GREENE, op. cit. supra note 34, at 47-81; see also WITNEY, op. cit. supra
note 37, at 27.
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into forcing his employees to join a union are unlawful and enjoinable.44
The significance of this conclusion depends on how the courts character-
ize the ambiguous situation of stranger picketing for organizational pur-
poses. Such conduct may be described as an effort to coerce the em-
ployees through the employer, or it may be described as an effort to per-
suade the employees to join the union. Since it is legal for employees to
join a union, picketing for the purpose of persuading them to join is
presumably legal. It is not clear from the decided cases which way the
Indiana courts are likely to characterize organizational picketing, because
there is authority for either characterization.45
When picketing is for a lawful purpose, the statute permits the grant
of an injunction to prevent violence or similar illegal conduct." Indiana
courts also grant injunctions when picketing involves false or misleading
statements," although it is not clear exactly how far the courts will go in
policing the accuracy of picket signs. 8
There is one appellate court decision, Local No. 135 v. Merchandise
Warehouse,4" which contains language implying that picketing may be en-
joined if it is "unjustified" in the circumstances. Such a doctrine would
be invidious because it would permit judges to grant or deny injunctions
on the basis of their subjective evaluation of the parties' behavior. But
although the opinion in Local 135 can be read broadly, the actual holding
is much more limited. The defendant union picketed an employer for
recognition after first organizing the employees but having failed to ask
for recognition. At the time of the picketing new employees were on the
job but the union did not try to organize them. The court held that an
injunction could issue because the facts showed no "labor dispute" and
the anti-injunction act applies only to labor disputes."0 While the court's
conclusion that no labor dispute existed is questionable, such a finding
limits the scope of the holding. For it was only after that conclusion was
reached that the court undertook to determine whether the picketing was
justified. Since the Indiana courts have generally construed "labor dis-
44. Roth v. Local 1460, Retail Clerks Union, supra note 43, at 371, 24 N.E.2d at
283.
45. Compare Davis v. Yates, 218 Ind. 364, 32 N.E.2d 86 (1941) and Spickelmier v.
Chambers, 113 Ind. App. 470, 47 N.E.2d 189 (1943), with Roth v. Local 1460, Retail
Clerks Union, supra note 44.
46. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-504, -507 (Burns 1965 Repl.).
47. Wiest v. Dirks, 215 Ind. 508, 20 N.E.2d 969, 971 (1939).
48. Compare Wiest v. Dirks, supra note 47, with Davis v. Yates, 218 Ind. 364, 32
N.E.2d 86 (1941).
49. 127 Ind. App. 57, 132 N.E.2d 715 (1956).
50. Id. at 61, 132 N.F.2d at 717-18.
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pute" fairly broadly5 in accordance with the broad statutory language,
the significance of this decision is likely to be limited.
The law dealing with union organization and strikes may be sum-
marized as follows. Union organization is lawful and the State's public
policy favors free choice by employees in deciding whether or not to be
represented. Once organized, employees have the right to strike. Strikes
to obtain better working conditions may not be enjoined unless violence
erupts or false or misleading picket signs are used. Even where violence
or deception is involved, certain procedures must be followed before an
injunction can be issued. The scope of the injunction permitted in such
cases is limited. Where picketing by outsiders is involved, the employer's
right to an injunction is not clear. Under certain circumstances he may
obtain one on the theory that no labor dispute exists, or on the theory
that the object of the picketing is unlawful. Under other circumstances
organizational picketing is permitted. Thus, the main features of Indi-
ana labor relations law in the private sector are freedom to organize and
use economic pressure with reliance on the privately-obtained injunction
as the primary method of limiting the use of economic pressure in labor
disputes. There are no formal or required substitutes for economic pres-
sure, although the Commissioner of Labor is empowered to "promote the
voluntary arbitration, mediation, and conciliation of disputes. .... ,
In addition to the anti-injunction statute and the common law, which
provide the main body of Indiana labor relations law, the statute books
contain special regulatory statutes-a fairly random collection of pri-
marily criminal statutes which do not conform to a coherent plan of
regulation.
The most comprehensive of the criminal statutes is the one enacted
in 1893, which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any individual, or member of any firm,
agent, officer, or employee of any company or corporation to
prevent employees from forming, joining and belonging to any
lawful labor organization, and any such individual member,
agent, officer or employee that coerces or attempts to coerce
employees, by discharging or threatening to discharge from their
employ or the employ of any firm, company, or corporation be-
cause of their connection with such lawful labor organization,
and any officer or employer, to exact [who exacts] a pledge from
workingmen that they will not become members of a labor
51. See Fair Share Organization v. Metnick, 134 Ind. App. 675, 188 N.E.2d 840
(1963).
52. IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2137 (Burns 1965 Repl.).
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organization as a consideration of employment, shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof in any court of
competent jurisdiction, shall be fined in any sum not exceeding
$100, or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both, in
the discretion of the court."
Despite the breadth of its language, the statute is largely unknown and,
as far as can be determined, unenforced."'
Another statute that appears to be an effort to regulate labor rela-
tions is entitled "Local Unions," and it provides:
No worker or group of workers who have a legal residence in
the State of Indiana shall be denied the right to select his or
their bargaining representative in this state, or be denied the
right to organize into a local union oi association to exist within
and pursuant to the laws of the state of Indiana: Provided, that
this act shall in no way be deemed to amend or repeal any of the
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act."
At first reading this appears to be a significant statute. The right of
employees to select a bargaining representative seems to imply that man-
agement is required to recognize and bargain with a properly chosen
union. But careful reading of the statute indicates that it was not meant
to impose a duty on employers to bargain collectively. The title and
language of the statute suggest that its primary purpose was to permit
the formation of local unions and that the legislature intended to prevent
undue control by national unions over local members. This interpreta-
tion is supported by such unofficial legislative history as can be found,"
and by the absence of a remedy for violation or provision for determining
questions of majority choice. Even the unnecessary reference to the
NLRA suggests an attempt to regulate union internal organization rather
than collective bargaining.
Other criminal statutes cover the following topics.
(1) Blacklisting. It is a misdemeanor, after discharging an em-
ployee, to hinder his obtaining other employment by other than a truthful
53. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4906 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
54. The prosecutors' offices in Indianapolis, South Bend, Fort Wayne, Hammond,
and Terre Haute were contacted on October 15, 1966. None of the officials spoken to
could recall a single instance in which the criminal statutes referred to in this article
were used.
55. IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2802 (Burns 1965 Repl.).
56. I am informed by Professor Witney of the Indiana University Economics De-
partment, author of INDIANA LABOR RELATIONS LAW, op. Cit. sztpra note 37, that the
statute grew out of an attempt by a national union to force Indiana employees to join a
Louisville local union.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
statement of the reason for discharge to a person to whom the employee
has applied for employment." An offender may also be liable for com-
pensatory and exemplary damages in a civil suit by the employee."
(2) Service Letters. It is a misdemeanor for an employer who re-
quires either letters of recommendation or written application to refuse,
on request, to furnish an employee with a letter stating the nature of his
service and the reason for his discharge or voluntary severance of
employment.59
(3) Notice of Strike. It is unlawful for an employment agency to
refer an applicant for a position at a place where a strike or lockout ex-
ists without first notifying the applicant of such situation.6"
(4) Strikebreaking. By virtue of an Indiana statute which sets
residence requirements for special police, prohibits authorization of im-
ports, and prohibits holding oneself out as a special policeman without
proper authorization, it is a misdemeanor to import professional strike-
breakers.6
(5) General Discrimination. It is unlawful for employers in mer-
cantile establishments, mines or quarries, laundries, renovating works,
bakeries, or printing offices, to discriminate against any person seeking
work.62 The precise meaning of this statute is unclear. It appears how-
ever to be a general provision covering discrimination in regard to hir-
ing, which would include discrimination because of union affiliation.
Not only do these statutes suggest an overall lack of planning, but
the lack of an effective remedy renders them largely nugatory. 3 In-
vestigation has failed to discover evidence of enforcement of any of the
criminal statutes referred to. 4
The only clear effort at comprehensive labor regulation by the State
of Indiana was the Public Utility Labor Dispute Act of 1947.6 This
act established elaborate procedures in lieu of strikes and lockouts for
settling disputes between public utility employees and their employers.
But public utilities are also subject to the provisions of the NLRA, hence
57. IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-301 (Burns 1965 Repl.).
58. IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-302 (Burns 1965 Repl.).
59. IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-122 (Burns 1965 Repl.).
60. IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-712 (Burns 1965 Repl.).
61. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4905 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
62. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-1014, -2308 (Burns 1965 Repl.).
63. Criminal statutes are a poor way to regulate labor relations. They do not rem-
edy the harm caused and their utilization is generally thought to be too harsh for the
offenses committed. Professor Bok of Harvard has commented "there has been a
marked reluctance even to utilize criminal proceedings .... ." Bok, The Regulation of
Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act,
78 HARv. L. Rlv. 38, 126 (1964).
64. See note 54 supra.
65. IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2401 (Burns 1965 Repl.).
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state action in this area is of highly doubtful validity under the rules of
federal pre-emption. The Supreme Court held a similar Wisconsin
statute invalid as attempted state interference with federally-created
rights.6 Subsequently the Indiana statute was declared invalid by the
Circuit Court of Vanderburgh County." The State did not appeal this
decision and has not since attempted to enforce the law, although it has
allowed it to remain on the books.6" Since that decision however, state
power over public utilities has been increased. By virtue of NLRA sub-
section 14(c) (2) Indiana law can be applied to those utilities which do
not meet the National Labor Relations Board's jurisdictional standards.6"
If there is a new attempt to enforce the law, the Indiana courts may hold
the statute a valid regulation of utilities now subject to state regulation.
It is also possible that the courts will hold the entire statute invalid, be-
cause the legislative purpose to deal with public utilities generally cannot
be effectuated. Thus, the statute is invalid as applied to most public
utilities and is of doubtful validity in the limited area of permissible state
jurisdiction.
The Rights of Public Employees
In Indiana, as elsewhere, significant numbers of public employees
have sought to claim collective bargaining rights similar to those enjoyed
by employees in the private sector. Such claims have been made to the
courts, to the legislature, and to executive officials. Public employees
have simultaneously sought to establish by judicial or other official pro-
nouncement the authority of public officials to enter into collective nego-
tiations with them and to secure legislation requiring collective bargain-
ing where a majority of employees request it.
The rights of public employee organizations under existing state
laws are unclear. The Indiana labor relations statutes referred to above
do not specifically include or exclude public employees, and no judicial
authority has been found dealing with the question. It is likely, how-
ever, that if the question should arise at the present time, the courts would
hold the statutes do not apply to public officials or public employees. As
noted, the Indiana anti-injunction law is a literal adaptation of the Norris-
66. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
67. Marshall v. Schricker, No. 66600 (Vanderburgh Co. Cir. Ct. 1951) (cited in
WITNEY, op. cit. supra note 37, at 61).
68. WITNEY, op. cit. supra note 37, at 61.
69. "The Board asserts jurisdiction over all public utilities which do a gross vol-
ume of business of at least $250,000 per annum or which have an outflow or inflow of
goods, materials, or services, whether directly or indirectly across State lines, of $50,000
or more per annum." DIvIsIoN OF INFORMATION, op. cit. supra note 10, at 6.
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LaGuardia Act, substituting only "state of Indiana" where "United
States" appears in the federal statute. The Supreme Court has held that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not apply to strikes against the United
States."0 In so doing, the Court referred to the "old and well-known
rule that statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights or
privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to
that effect." 71  State courts have reached similar results under state
law.
It would be proper for Indiana courts to follow this precedent. The
language of the anti-injunction statute seems to require that the statute
be applied to all public employees or none. There is no basis for distin-
guishing strikes by public employees performing essential services from
those by public employees performing nonessential services. Moreover,
the state anti-injunction law was passed at a time when the concept of
collective bargaining in the public service was unrecognized. Applica-
tion of the statute makes sense only as part of the policy of permitting
use of economic pressure as a part of collective bargaining. Since col-
lective bargaining was deemed inappropriate it is fair to conclude that
the statute was not meant to apply. That this was the understanding of
the framers is underscored by the references in section 2 to "owners of
property" and "ownership association.""3  The other statutes referred to
would probably be held inapplicable to public employees on similar
grounds. In any case their impact on the rights of public employees
would not be great.
The significant question therefore is what right to organize and
bargain collectively public employees have under the common law. This
question has not been dealt with by the courts, but it has been the subject
of two fairly lengthy Attorney General opinions.7 The first opinion
was issued in 1944. The Attorney General concluded that it was beyond
the power of public officials to enter into collective bargaining contracts.
The opinion rested on the conclusion that a collective bargaining agree-
ment has the legal status of a contract or a continuing offer by the em-
ployer. The Attorney General assumed without discussion that under
70. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1946).
71. Id. at 272.
72. See Hansen v. Commonwealth, 344 Mass. 214, 181 N.E.2d 843 (1962), and
cases referred to therein.
73. IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-502 (Burns 1965 Repl.). This language was referred to
by the Supreme Court in United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 273 n.24 (1946).
74. 1944 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. IND. 224, No. 55; 1966 Op's. Ar'Y GEN. IND. No. 22.
Both opinions seemed to assume that general labor legislation is applicable to public
employees. Neither opinion really discussed the issue. For the reason indicated above,
it is unlikely that the courts would accept these conclusions.
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Indiana law public officials do not have the right to enter into such con-
tracts or to make such offers. He did not explain how such contracts dif-
fer from the myriad of contracts, including employment contracts, which
public officials enter into in the course of their official duty. The only
ground on which the Attorney General sought to support this conclusion
was that salaries or wages in public employment are often fixed by statute
and hence would not be a proper subject for contract. Indeed, the as-
sumption which seems to underlie the Attorney General's opinion is that
the negotiation of wages is so central to collective bargaining that it
would be foolish to think of the one without the other. As indicated
earlier, this is an outdated view of the function of collective negotiations.
The establishment of satisfactory personnel policies and grievance pro-
cedures has been recognized as a central function of collective bargaining.
The 1944 opinion did recognize the right of public employees to join
unions and the authority of public officials to meet with them to discuss
problems. The Attorney General did not consider the implications of this
conclusion. For example, did the right to meet and discuss mutual prob-
lems carry with it the authority to enter into informal agreements and
memoranda of understanding? This question was raised by the adop-
tion of Executive Order 10988 for the federal service. The system of
collective negotiation established in the federal service contemplates agree-
ments which would probably not be enforceable in court against the
agency.7" Public employee unions in Indiana have argued that a system
similar to that of 10988 could be adopted consistently with the Attorney
General's opinion. While some public officials took the position that the
Attorney General's opinion precluded any formal dealings with labor
organizations, many conscientious public officials were uncertain as to
what relations with unions would be proper. It was inevitable that fur-
ther clarification would be sought.
In July of 1966 the Trustees of Indiana University, faced with union
organization and demands for recognition, sought to work out a system
of collective negotiation modeled after Executive Order 10988. They
issued a ruling entitled "Conditions for Cooperation between Employee
Organization and the Administration of Indiana University."7  The
"Conditions" permitted a union which could establish majority support
to negotiate in a limited area with university officials in order to arrive
at "joint written recommendations to the trustees." No formal agree-
75. After negotiations, agreements must still be approved by the agency head and
are always subject to changes in agency procedure. F_xec. Order No. 10988, § 7, supra
note 23. Any arbitration is made subject to the approval of the agency head. See § 7
of the order.
76. See 1966 Ops. Arr'Y GEN. IND. app. A.
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ment was contemplated. It was the opinion of those involved that the
system did not conflict with the 1944 Attorney General opinion." Never-
theless, the legality of the system was not absolutely clear and a new At-
torney General opinion was sought by State Senator Chavis. On October
6, 1966 an opinion was issued by Attorney General John Dillon."8 It
affirmed the right of the Trustees of Indiana University and of other
public officials who are expressly or impliedly authorized to hire em-
ployees to set up procedures similar to the conditions for cooperation
adopted by the Trustees of Indiana University."9 The Attorney General
found that the procedures established were permissible under the 1944
opinion. He declined to specifically overrule the 1944 opinion, and he
reached no conclusion on the question of whether a formal written agree-
ment binding both sides could be negotiated betwen a public employer and
the representative of its employees. Much of his discussion, however,
suggested that were the issue presented to him, the Attorney General
would conclude that such an agreement is permissible. The new opinion
was critical of the analysis of the 1944 opinion, and several times pointed
out that the earlier opinion proceeded from an outdated view of collec-
tive bargaining. "The current attitude is not that collective bargaining
has an uncertain status unless it is specifically authorized, but that the
right to bargain collectively is an attribute of every citizen to whom it is
not denied by statute."8
The conclusion reached by the Attorney General on the question pre-
sented to him was sound. As the opinion stated, one would assume "that
there could be no serious question concerning the right of public officials
to agree to listen to their employees. . . ."" And the implication that
more formal collective agreements would be valid also seems sound.
However, although the opinion represents a step forward, many un-
answered questions remain. For one thing, the opinion did not clarify
the problem of whether existing statutes apply to public employees. Al-
though the opinion does not really analyze the question, it strongly im-
plies at one point that the anti-injunction statute does apply in the public
sector. However, later the opinion pointed out that "there are some dif-
ferences between the rights of public and private employees" particularly
with respect to the right to strike which has generally been denied public
77. The author was one of those who so advised the University.
78. 1966 Ops. A'y GENz. IND. No. 22.
79. Id. at 14 (all page references to 1966 Ops. AT'Y GEN. IND. No. 22 are to the
original, unpublished opinion).
80. Id. at 13.
81. Id. at 5.
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employees.82 The conclusion that public employees do not have the right
to strike suggests that they are not covered by the anti-injunction statute
because illegal strikes are not protected by the statute. On the other hand,
the view that public employees do not have the right to strike was not
clearly adopted. The opinion referred to the fundamental rights which
public employees share with all citizens of the United States and the
State of Indiana. It cited for this point the Karges Furniture case,8"
which first affirmed existence of a right to strike in Indiana. The
opinion suggested that the "Local Union" statute applies to public em-
ployees and gives them the right to select a bargaining representative.
The language suggested a duty on the part of public officials to bargain
with a union chosen by a majority of their employees. The suggestion is
questionable, both in holding that the statute applies to public employees
and, as noted above, in indicating that it creates a substantive right to
bargain collectively. Thus the Attorney General's opinion suggested
conflicting answers to three basic questions:
(1) Is there a duty on the part of public officials to meet with
unions selected by a majority of their employees?
(2) Do public employees have a right to strike?
(3) Does the anti-injunction statute apply to public employees?
It would be surprising, in view of the growing militancy of public em-
ployee unions, if they did not take an expansive view of the Attorney
General's opinion and assume favorable answers to these questions. Un-
less clarifying legislation is adopted, these issues will be presented to the
Indiana courts.
Coiclusions: The Need for a Bill
Private Law Area. Analysis of the Indiana law of labor relations
in the private sector indicates the need for a labor relations statute. Al-
though the State has a strongly-announced policy of favoring free em-
ployee choice, it does not have the mechanism by which such a policy can
be implemented. There are no procedures, other than informal ones, for
establishing majority choice or for determining the proper bargaining
unit and voter eligibility. Nor is there a procedure for remedying inter-
ference by employers or unions with that free choice. There are no
remedies for discriminatory discharge, for refusal by an employer to
meet with a union, or for refusal by a union to bargain with an employer
in good faith. There are no guidelines for the right of striking employees
to reinstatement or for the right of an employer to protect himself by
82. Id. at 12.
83. Id. at 8.
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hiring replacements. There is not adequate protection against strikes by
a union which has been rejected by the employees, and no protection for
an established bargaining relationship against an outside union. Indeed,
other than the limited possibility of an injunction, there is little limitation
on union behavior. There is no substitute provided in place of economic
force in the settlement of disputes, except in the Public Utilities Labor
Dispute Act, which is of highly doubtful validity.8"
The absence of any other limitations on union behavior probably ac-
counts for the courts' conclusion that strikes for unlawful purposes may
be enjoined. As noted above, this conclusion conflicts with the language
and scheme of the anti-injunction statute and with its primary purpose.
It is unfortunate that the privately obtained injunction is the primary
means of limiting strikes and picketing. Under this system an individual
judge has the power to thwart a strike by declaring its purpose improper.
As the complaining party, an employer may seek relief from any judge
in the jurisdiction. If a judge can be found who will take a restrictive
view of its legality, legitimate union activity may be enjoined. The
possibility of getting the injunction set aside will generally not be an
adequate remedy. Such appeals take time and with respect to the right
to strike timing is often crucial. Thus the ability of employees to engage
in strikes and other union activity varies from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion. In some jurisdictions it may be too broad; in others too limited.
With the enactment of a state labor act other techniques would be avail-
able for limiting the use of economic pressure. Questions of injunctive
relief would generally be considered first by the State Board, thus insur-
ing some degree of uniformity with respect to the availability of
injunctions.
Several criminal statutes purport to regulate labor relations, but
these statutes are almost never applied. This is probably fortunate since
the imposition of criminal sanctions is hardly a way to improve indus-
trial relations. In sum, the law of Indiana, as a practical matter, en-
courages the use of economic pressure because it does not provide the
necessary procedure for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Limitation
on the use of economic pressure has resulted from grants of injunctive
relief contrary to the language of the Indiana statute. Reliance on this
form of relief is unfortunate for the reasons indicated above. In addi-
tion the Indiana law concerning the appropriateness of such relief is quite
confusing" thus making it difficult for parties to adjust their activity
to conform to the law.
84. See notes 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
85. See 1966 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. IND. No. 22, at 7-11.
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The Public Employee. The need for legislation is particularly ap-
parent with respect to public employees. Not only is there no machinery
for determining and protecting the wishes of employees, but the nature
of the governing law is totally confused. There is no explicit statement
of basic rights, and the extent to which public employees are covered by
existing statutes is completely unclear. The extent to which the law
grants to public employees the rights to organize, to bargain collectively,
and to strike is not clearly spelled out by the statutes, and the questions
have not been settled by adjudication. It is unfortunate that the most
significant statements on the rights of public employees in the State of
Indiana are contained in the Attorney General's opinions of 1944 and
1966, since such opinions are not a binding determination of state law,
and they may be ignored by the courts, and indeed, by other public of fi-
cials.8  Attempts to enjoin or prohibit union activity or collective bar-
gaining by public employees are likely to occur. A series of inconsistent
court opinions is not unlikely, and many years might elapse before the
legal status of union organization in the public service is established.
Thus, the same reasons which suggest the need for a labor relations act
in the private sector apply with even greater force in the public sector.
As Attorney General Dillon stated:
The General Assembly can, by statute, further delineate the
powers and duties of state and local public employers to engage
in collective bargaining in the classical sense with their em-
ployees. In my opinion, in view of the prevailing confusion in
this field, and the changes which are sweeping aside out-moded
concepts in other states, such action may well be indicated in
Indiana.8 7
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST PASSAGE OF A BILL
The basic arguments in favor of a state labor relations act have been
stated above. Many of the major arguments against the enactment of a
bill are contained in the minority report of the Legislative Advisory
Committee.
The Private Sector
The main contention of the dissenters is that: "There is no con-
vincing evidence of need for such an act. Unions can now organize small
86. Dodd v. State, 18 Ind. 56, 66 (1866); Welliver v. Coate, 65 Ind. App. 195
(1917) ; McClure v. Marion Super. Ct., 239 Ind. 472, 509, 158 N.E.2d 264, 283 (1959).
The same rule applies in other states. See, e.g., Van Riper v. Jenkins, 141 N.J. Eq. 99,
45 A.2d 845 (1946).
87. 1966 Ops. A7T'y GEN. IND. No. 22, at 14.
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employers, and do. The Indiana Division of Labor conducts consent
elections at the present time and under existing state statutes. 88
The statement that "there is no convincing evidence of need" is
merely a restatement of the dissenters' conclusion. Depending upon one's
values, the need may be established by a close analysis of existing law.
For those who value a clear and consistent law of labor relations, the
need for change is found in the haphazard and confused state of Indiana
labor law. For those who value the protection of employees and the
establishment of peaceful procedures, the need for a state act is demon-
strated by their absence. For those who think public employees should
have the right to engage in collective negotiation if they choose, the need
for an act is demonstrated by the fact that this right is not now estab-
lished under state law and that the rules governing public employees are
quite tenuous.
\While it is true that small employers may now be organized, as indi-
cated above, the ground rules under which such organization may take
place are not spelled out. There is no way of insuring that the desires of
the employees will be protected against coercion by employers or by
unions. True, consent elections are conducted by the Division of Labor,
but there is no mechanism by which an unwilling employer or union may
be forced to an election. Moreover, there is no way of insuring the
validity of the election, and if an election is held it does not necessarily
resolve the issue of employee representation.
Additionally, the dissenters argue that: "Enactment of a law of
this type could be construed as an anti-small business action. . . . Ordi-
narily the relationship between the employer and the employee is close
and friendly. It is believed the small employer is better off without a
state act in the labor relations field."8"
It is not clear whether the dissenters are talking about the impres-
sion that will be created by passing such a bill, whether they are saying
that the bill suggested in the majority report is unfair, or whether their
argument is that any bill would be unfair to small business.
It is true that the bill outlined by the majority is unnecessarily fa-
vorable to unions, and to this extent the point is well taken. A fair labor
relations law, however, is not likely to be viewed as anti-small business.9"
To the extent the minority contends that even a fair bill should not be
passed because of the possible reaction of small businessmen, this posi-
tion is much less persuasive. The dissenters suggest that a labor rela-
88. Minority Report, supra note 32, at 3.
89. Ibid.
90. See notes 91-93 infra and accompanying text.
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tions act will intrude on the "close and friendly" relations which now exist
between small businessmen and their employees. But this is most un-
likely. Where relations are close and friendly, organization pressure is
unlikely to arise spontaneously and union organizers are not likely to
mount an organizing campaign. In general, unions are unwilling to spend
the time and money necessary for an organizing campaign unless there is
some hope of victory, and it is a commonplace of union organization that
an organizing drive will only succeed when there exists considerable dis-
content over wages and working conditions. This is particularly true of
small businesses precisely because employer-employee relations are likely
to be closer. From the union's viewpoint, the possible gain in terms of
increased organization is by definition small. Attempts to organize small
business are generally restricted to situations where the existence of em-
ployee dissatisfaction is brought to the organizer's attention. More-
over, the law now permits organizational efforts and strikes. All that a
labor relations act would add is protection for the employees and an
orderly procedure for determining the wishes of the majority. In a fairly
drawn act the wishes of the employees once expressed would be binding
for at least a year so that an employer would not be subject to consistent
harassment. Thus, it is not completely self-evident that the "small em-
ployer is better off without a state act in the labor relations field." But
even if it is accepted that employers are better off under the present ar-
rangement, it is hard to see that their legitimate interests are sufficiently
imperilled to warrant rejection of procedures which will protect the
choice of their employees with respect to union organization. The an-
nounced policy of the State is in favor of such free choice. Unless one
can demonstrate that employees in small businesses are not entitled to the
same degree of self-determination that other employees are, a legitimate
state act protecting such choice is warranted.
A somewhat similar argument is that: "Enactment of a state labor
relations act can be a strong factor in gaining for Indiana the dubious
reputation of being 'union dominated.' It would adversely affect the
state's business climate and the state's efforts to attract new business and
industry and it would discourage expansions of existing business and
industry."'"
A state labor law which adequately recognizes the legitimate interests
of employers and which protects employees against coercion by unions is
unlikely to give Indiana such a reputation. Our neighbor state, Wiscon-
sin, which has one of the oldest and most comprehensive labor relations.
statutes has never acquired such a reputation. Indeed, in Wisconsin,.
91. Minority Report, supra note 32, at 4.
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management and labor as well as both political parties have expressed
their satisfaction with the operation of their labor relations act,12 which
is similar to the one herein suggested. In any case a state labor act is
unlikely to affect the decisions of large firms to locate in Indiana be-
cause such businesses are covered by the federal act and would not be
affected by state law. The experience of other states does not indicate
that an exodus of small business is likely to follow enactment of a state
labor relations statute."3 Even if it could be demonstrated that business
could be attracted or kept more easily in the absence of a state labor act,
this gain would have to be balanced against the state's interest in protect-
ing the wishes of its employees and in promoting industrial peace.
The dissenters also attacked the need for a bill on economic grounds:
"Enactment of a state labor relations act would create another agency or
bureau. Conservative estimates place the annual cost to taxpayers for
such an agency and its large staff between $250,000 and $400,000.""9
It is difficult to determine the basis for these estimates"5 but even
assuming their validity they do not disprove the need for an act. The
cost would be high only if there is much need for the agency's services.
If there is a considerable need it means that the agency will have a signifi-
cant impact in protecting the rights of employees, unions, and employers.
Moreover, as noted above, in many situations the act should serve to sub-
stitute orderly procedures for economic warfare. The cost to the public
of not having an act (in needless strikes, lost production, and wages) is
probably greater than the cost of the act, even accepting the dissenters'
figures.
The Public Employee
With respect to public employees the dissenters raise the spectre of
strikes in essential services. They begin with a rhetorical question:
"Should such employees of Government have the authority to strike and
curtail vital and essential services relating to public health, safety and
sanitation and orderly conduct of the affairs of taxpayers generally?
92. Information on the operation of the Wisconsin act was obtained through tele-
phone conversations with Board member Anderson and Mr. Sundal of the Wisconsin
State Board of Resources and Development.
93. Mr. Sundal stated that to his knowledge Wisconsin has not faced such a prob-
lem and that if it had he would certainly have been aware of it.
94. Minority Report, supra note 32, at 3.
95. The Wisconsin Board which has jurisdiction over both public and private em-
ployees in addition to arbitration and mediation services has operated at an annual cost
of approximately $250,000. Letter from Michael Harder, Wisconsin Department of
Administration, Oct. 26, 1966, on file at the Indiana Law Journal office. In Indiana the
cost figures should be less than those of Wisconsin since mediation, arbitration, and
conciliation services are already provided by the State Labor Commission. See note
52 supra.
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Should employees of government (state, county and city) be granted the
authority to bargain collectively and sign binding agreements with a unit
of government?""9 It is important to recognize that two separate ques-
tions are presented. The first is whether machinery should be established
to grant and protect the right of public employees to organize and bargain
collectively. The second is whether they should be permitted to strike.
In order to answer the first question affirmatively, it is not necessary to
grant the right to strike. Indeed, establishing legitimate and workable
procedures for collective negotiations may be the only way to prevent
strikes. The minority report argues that "public employee unionization
in Indiana has resulted in strikes""7 but to the extent that this is true, it
argues in favor, not against, including public employees in a comprehen-
sive bill. The statement recognizes that unionization has taken place in
the absence of authorizing legislation. Unionization will not cease or
diminish if a bill is not passed. The increased number of public em-
ployees, their unhappiness with their wages and working conditions, and
the new high priority which their organization has acquired in the labor
movement, all insure that organization will increase. If orderly pro-
cedures are not established for obtaining recognition and bargaining col-
lectively, inevitably the unions will resort to strikes. This result is almost
self-evident, and experience has shown it to be true even where the law
has expressly denied public employees the right to strike.9" And as has
been shown above, in Indiana the law is not nearly so explicit.
The minority report also argues that "a union contract can bind a
new administration to another's personnel policies and practices."99  It is
not shown, however, that such a result is undesirable and the conclusion
is far from self-evident. On the contrary, public employees should feel
secure in the fact that their working conditions will not change radically
with each change in administration. This is the theory behind civil serv-
ice legislation. In fact changes of administration in Indiana have not
resulted in wholesale changes in personnel policy.90 Moreover, to the
extent that flexibility is required, it can be achieved by one of two simple
expedients. The law can specify that collective agreements in public
96. Minority Report, supra note 32, at 2.
97. Ibid.
98. As stated in A.B.A., supra note 19, at 89, "Legislation attempting to authorize
strikes of public employees has proved ill-advised and unworkable. Solution of the
problem rests on sound administrative policies and procedures."
99. Minority Report, supra note 32, at 2.
100. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 60-1501 to -1506 (Burns 1965 Repl.), which makes it
difficult to change personnel policies. Mr. R. Hoff, Personnel Superintendent of Indi-
ana, indicated in a telephone conversation that such policies rarely change with each new
administration.
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service cannot extend beyond the life of the administration in which they
are negotiated. This can also be accomplished by synchronizing the term
of agreements with terms of political offices.
Finally the minority report argues that wages and presumably other
issues are inappropriate for collective bargaining in the public service.
"Labor unions in the private sector of the economy can bargain over
'labor's share' of the profits. In government there are no profits. Union
participation in this procedure [establishing budgets] could lead to union
interference or domination of areas of government delegated to elected
public officials."1 1 This is not an argument against inclusion of public
employees in a bill, it is an argument in favor of limiting the areas for
collective negotiation. Executive Order 10988 limits the scope of col-
lective negotiation and requires that a clause be inserted in all collective
agreements recognizing certain basic management prerogatives. A simi-
lar limitation and a similar clause could be required by the state labor
relations act.
It is now recognized that the significance of collective bargaining
extends beyond wages and hours. Some of the main benefits which em-
ployees desire are the fixing of fair procedures and the right to protest
arbitrary policies and actions. These benefits, which typically culminate
in a grievance procedure, should be available to public employees. The
announced public policy of the State of Indiana favors free choice by
employees of their bargaining representative, and there is no reason why
that policy should not be extended to embrace public employees. As
stated in the 1955 report of the Labor Law Committee of the American
Bar Association, "a government which imposes upon other employers cer-
tain obligations in dealing with their employees may not in good faith
refuse to deal with its own public servants on a reasonably similar, fa-
vorable basis, modified, of course, to meet the exigencies of the public
service." '"0
V. THE NATURE OF A DESIRABLE LABOR ACT
The main features of a desirable act have already been indicated. In
the private section it should generally parallel existing federal legislation.
This means establishing an agency with power to conduct and supervise
elections and to rule in the first instance on unfair labor practice charges.
Employees should be granted the right to participate or refrain from
participation in union activities and to be represented or not as they
101. Minority Report, supra note 32, at 2.
102. A.B.A., Section of Labor Relations Law, Report of the Committee on Labor
Relations of Government Employees 90 (1955).
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choose. Actions by employers and by unions which interfere with these
rights should be prohibited as unfair labor practices. In general the
language of the federal act should be adopted with respect to unfair labor
practices and election procedure. The Indiana Board in construing state
law should have the benefit of whatever guidance can be derived from
discussion of the same language by the NLRB and courts in construing
the federal act. With respect to public employees the same general rights
of organization should be extended, but the right to engage in collective
bargaining should be limited to those matters within the statutory discre-
tion of public officials. However, acceptance of the basic structure out-
lined above still leaves open a number of significant questions concerning
the nature of a desirable act. Some of these questions are discussed below.
Unfair Labor Practices
The sections defining employer unfair labor practices provided in
the federal statute have given adequate protection to employees against
abuses and interference with their rights. These provisions should be
included in the Indiana statute. Their adoption will provide the State
Board with language whose basic meaning has already been established
and whose outer limits have often been dealt with by courts and scholars.
The same is generally true of the provisions defining union unfair
labor practices, except subsection 8(e) and subsection 8(b) (7),"' the
two provisions added by the Landrum-Grif fin Act. A fixed meaning
has not been established for either subsection and they are both so poorly
drafted that an effort should be made to improve them. Subsection 8 (e)
was intended to outlaw hot cargo clauses, whereby one employer agrees
not to deal with another because the latter does not deal with a union. It
is questionable whether such clauses should be outlawed at all, but sub-
section 8(e) goes well beyond this simple purpose and prohibits any ar-
rangement whereby one employer agrees to cease doing business with
another, even if the purpose of the clause is to create work for the first
employer's employees." 4 If it is thought desirable to outlaw hot cargo
clauses, much more limited language should be used.
Subsection 8(b) (7) limits the right of unions to picket for recogni-
tional and organizational purposes under certain circumstances. It seems
proper to prohibit such picketing after an election expressing employee
choice and therefore subsections 8(b) (7) (A) and (B) should be en-
acted, possibly with some tightening of the language. Subsection
103. National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(b) (7), (e).
104. See, e.g., Hickey, Subcontracting Clauses Under Section 8(e) of the NLRA,
40 Nom DAmE LAw. 377 (1965).
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8(b) (7) (C) is far more controversial because it bans the use of organi-
zational picketing even before an election. In many situations it prevents
unions from using the allegiance of their supporters as a basis for organ-
izing undecided employees. If it is decided that the need for such picket-
ing is obviated by the new rights granted under the act, a clause should
be drafted avoiding the verbal quagmires faced by anyone seeking to
make sense of subsection 8(b) (7) (C). 5
Subsection 8(b) (4) of the federal act, primarily aimed at prevent-
ing secondary boycotts, is another section which is exceptionally difficult
to understand. Its meaning baffles experts in the field. An attempt
should be made at redrafting this subsection, although its importance in
a state act is minimal because almost all secondary disputes come within
the NLRB's jurisdiction."'
In order to resolve a perplexing question under the NLRA it should
be made an unfair labor practice for a union to violate its duty to repre-
sent all employees in the unit fairly. Furthermore, it should be made
clear that a recognized union violates its duty of fair representation if it
denies membership on invidious grounds such as race, color, or creed.
Striking or urging a strike should be an unfair labor practice for a
union representing public employees, unless the right to strike has been
specifically granted under the procedures outlined below.
1 7
The Right of Public Employees to Strike
Until recently there has been little discussion of this issue. Officials
who commented on the issue seemed to assume that the reasons against
permitting strikes in the public service were too apparent to need stat-
105. It would require a separate article to indicate the nature of the problems in-
volved in interpreting § 8(b) (7) (c). They are well indicated in Meltzer, Organizational
Picketing and the dVLRB: Five on a Seesaw, 30 U. CmI L. REv. 78 (1962). One pos-
sible solution is contained in a model act prepared by the Harvard Student Legislature,
3 HARV. J. LEG. 415, 422 (1966). Under this approach organizational and recognitional
picketing is outlawed where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under
§ 8 (for an election) being filed within a reasonable time not to exceed thirty days.
106. Jurisdiction will be asserted in secondary boycott cases if the direct outflow
of the primary employer plus the indirect outflow of the secondary employer exceeds
$100,000. Teamsters Union, 121 N.L.R.B. 221, 222 (1958). Jurisdiction will also be
asserted in secondary boycott cases if the dollar volume of the primary employer's busi-
ness plus the entire business of the secondary employer at the location affected by the
boycott meets jurisdictional standards. Madison Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 134
N.L.R.B. 517, 518 (1961).
107. A question which should be carefully studied is the makeup of the board. In
the first years, when basic rules are being established, a competent board is particularly
desirable. It may be, however, that the state cannot afford the salaries necessary to
attract able people on a full time basis. The answer might be in a part-time board paid
on a per diem basis. The initial workload is unlikely to be so heavy as to preclude this
approach, which would have the advantage of keeping down the cost of enforcing the
act.
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ing."'0 The feeling that it is undesirable to permit such strikes is prob-
ably still held by the majority of voters and public officials. But re-
cently the assumption has increasingly been attacked by scholars, labor
leaders, and lawyers. As government operations expand to include non-
essential services, the reasons for a blanket denial of the right to strike
lose their force, and appeals based on theoretical concepts such as
sovereignty become less convincing. A survey of recent literature on the
subject indicates that the majority of the writers favor granting some
public employees the right to strike.'
Opponents of granting public employees the right to strike often base
their argument on the need to maintain essential services such as police
and fire protection and sanitation services. The assumption that per-
mitting strikes in such services will involve a greater cost to society than
should be tolerated in the interest of free collective bargaining is an easy
one to accept and will not be challenged here. But there are government
services and agencies whose relation to the public health, safety, and
general welfare is much less obvious. In terms of possible impact on the
public it is impossible to defend a rule which prohibits employees in a
state parking lot from striking, although the right is granted to teamster's
responsible for deliveries of milk, food, and drugs.
Theoretical arguments against strikes in the public service are
premised primarily on notions of sovereignty."' Strikes against govern-
ment are deemed inconsistent with its sovereignty. Such arguments are
difficult to meet because they are difficult to understand. The concept
of rights against the government is basic to our society. Its roots go
back to Bracton and beyond. The courts regularly enforce rights limit-
ing government in dealing with its citizens. In general they insist that
government abide by its contracts, pay for its debts, and make restitution
for the wrongs committed by its servants. Since the existence of these
rights does not deprive the state of sovereignty, it is difficult to see why
the existence of a limited right to strike would.
Nor is there anything about the state as an employer which requires
108. See, e.g., statements by Presidents Roosevelt and Coolidge and by Virginia
Governor Trich cited in Weisenfeld, supra note 14, at 685-87.
109. INDEPENDENT STUDY GROUP, THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN NATIONAL LABOR POL-
Icy 76 (1961). This work was the report of an independent study group composed of the
leading labor relations scholars in the country including Clark Kerr, President of the
University of California, Philip Taft of Brown University, David Cole, Albert Rees of
the University of Chicago, and John Dunlop of Harvard. See also A.B.A., supra note
100, at 89; Note, 40 NoRE DAME LAw. 606, 647-48 (1965).
110. This argument is still heard today. See, e.g., Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v.
Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951). But it is being increasingly chal-
lenged even in the courts. See Board of Educ. v. Public School Employees Union, 233
Minn. 144, 45 N.W.2d 797 (1951).
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limiting the right to strike even when the cost of the strike in terms of
possible hardship to the public is not very great. It has been urged that
it is inconsistent with the dignity of the state for it to be forced to yield
to economic pressure.11' Such an argument is obviously related to the
notion of sovereignty discussed above, and in large part the answer to one
answers the other. It should also be pointed out that large corporations
often yield to strike pressure with no discernible loss of dignity and state
governments regularly respond to all kinds of direct and indirect pressure.
Possibly it is feared that public officials are more likely to yield to
a strike than private businessmen, either because their own money is not
involved or because they fear that a tough or intransigent position will be
politically damaging. So long as bargaining cannot concern wages, strikes
for higher wages would not be protected and the absence of personal fi-
nancial concern would be unimportant. Legal strikes could only be under-
taken to support legitimate demands. In the public service demands
would largely be concerned with employment procedures and practices.
Thus, disputes would concern matters with which agency officials are
deeply concerned. Nor is it likely to be politically dangerous to resist a
strike. Public opinion in most strikes ranges between indifference and
hostility.
The most troublesome effect of permitting strikes by public em-
ployees providing nonessential government services is the difficulty in
identifying the employees who should be granted the right. It would be
dangerous for the legislature alone to undertake this task. An attempt
to enumerate agencies performing nonessential services would be time
consuming and would lead to controversy which could defeat the entire
act. Moreover, the possibility of changes in the name or function of ex-
isting agencies and the creation of new agencies would mean that any
such enumeration could only be valid for a short period. An attempt by
the legislature to cope with this problem by distinguishing in general
language between fundamental and nonessential governmental operations
would leave considerable doubt as to its meaning; doubt which could only
be resolved by strikes or by involved lawsuits, with a substantial risk that
either because of a faulty description or an overly-liberal interpretation
strikes in the public service would be permitted to a greater extent than
is desirable. The question should be dealt with by the board in the first
instance. The board should be given authority to determine after a hear-
ing that employees in certain governmental bargaining units would not
substantially endanger public health, safety, or welfare by striking. This
determination should be subject to judicial review and should not be
111. Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., su¢pra note 110.
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binding until after the next meeting of the legislature. Thus, the legis-
lature would have a chance to reverse the board's decision at its next ses-
sion by amending the act. In cases where the board makes such a deter-
mination and it is not overruled, the employees in the unit will have the
same right to engage in concerted activity, including strikes, that is
granted to employees in the private sector. In all other cases involving
public employees the right to strike should be prohibited.112
Inclusion of Teachers
One of the most troublesome questions to be faced is whether to ex-
clude public school teachers from the coverage of the act. It has been
argued that collective bargaining and union organization are inconsistent
with the professional image of teachers, and therefore they should not be
included. But the act would provide for collective bargaining only if
teachers themselves so elected. If teachers should feel that collective bar-
gaining is consistent with their professional standing, why should the
law say no? There is no indication that organization has hindered the pro-
fessional development of other groups such as sea pilots. And the brief ex-
perience in other states suggests that the professional standing of teachers
may be enhanced rather than reduced through collective negotiation.'
This is not to say that the special status of teachers should go un-
recognized. Certainly teachers should not be joined together with non-
professionals for unit purposes unless they choose to be so joined. More-
over teachers may favor a form of organization which includes super-
visory personnel together with rank and file teachers. The act should
make clear that such an organization is permissible. The act should
maximize the ability of teachers to choose their own form of negotiation,
but they should not be arbitrarily excluded from its benefits.
112. An act should contain a clause similar to the following:
The Board may upon petition by a union which represents public em-
ployees hold hearings for the purpose of determining whether such employees
could be granted the right to strike without severely interfering with neces-
sary governmental functions. If after a hearing and upon appropriate find-
ings the Board determines that granting the right to strike to a governmental
bargaining unit would not endanger the public health, safety, or welfare it may
determine that the bargaining unit constitutes a non-essential governmental bar-
gaining unit. If such a determination is made, the employees in the unit have
the right to strike and engage in concerted activity to the same extent as non-
governmental employees covered -by this act.
113. See generally MosKow, TEACHERS AND UNIONS (1966). In New York City
CORE and SNCC picketed outside a newly-constructed school in a Negro neighborhood
to force selection of a Negro in place of the already-designated white principal. The
teachers' union played a significant role in resisting this pressure on behalf of the policy
of selecting school principals on the basis of merit without regard to race. See
New Yorker, 44-45 (Oct. 1, 1966).
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The Resolution of Bargaining Impasses in the Public Service
Since most public employees would not be permitted to strike under
the proposed bill an alternative to economic pressure must be found for
resolving bargaining impasses. While no completely satisfactory substi-
tute exists, several possibilities can be considered.
In the federal service, Executive Order 10988 does not deal with
this issue. But the subsequent implementation of the order in the
postal service provides that if the original negotiators cannot agree,
the matter is forwarded to high level union and management offi-
cials with final resolution left to the agency head. This method of
resolving bargaining impasses has been the least satisfactory aspect of
the implementation of Executive Order 10988.11 Most states which pro-
hibit strikes but permit bargaining either do not deal with the matter or
provide for elaborate mediation and fact-finding procedures." These
provisions and recommendations by fact-finding committees do not say
what is to be done if this mediation is unsuccessful or if the fact-finding
committee's recommendations are unacceptable. While resort to media-
tion and non-compulsory recommendations in private industry has been
less than completely successful, there is reason to believe that a recom-
mended settlement in public service will have much more impact. The
agency head who rejects the recommendation of a fact-finding commis-
sion is much more vulnerable to public censure than is a private business-
man. A union official who rejects the proposal has no legal alternative,
and illegal strikes are much less likely when engaging in them jeopardizes
the established bargaining rights and relationship. It is likely that pro-
viding a procedure leading first to mediation and finally to the appoint-
ment of a fact-finding committee with powers of recommendation would
be adequate to resolve bargaining impasses in the public service." 6 If
114. See Hart, The Impasse in Labor Relations in the Federal Civil Service, 19
IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 175 (1966).
115. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-9.1-1 to -9 (Supp. 1965); CONN. GEN-. ANN.
STAT. §§ 7-469 to -473 (Cum. Supp. 1965).
116. It is recommended that a clause such as the following be included in a state
labor relations act:
In the event that a government agency and the labor organization which
represents its employees are not able to reach an agreement during bargaining
negotiations either party may certify this fact to the State Commissioner of
Labor. Upon receipt of such notification the Commissioner shall assign a
mediator to work with the parties to assist them in reaching an agreement. If
after twenty days, the mediator decides that further negotiation is likely to be
fruitless he may certify to the Commissioner that an impasse exists. The
Commissioner shall then appoint a fact-finding panel of three persons. The
panel shall have the power to hold hearings, receive evidence, and compel at-
tendance by the parties. Within 90 days, the panel shall issue a recommenda-
tion of settlement with respect to all matters in dispute, copies of which shall
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this approach subsequently appears to be unsuccessful, it might be desir-
able to provide for compulsory arbitration. In most cases the governor
will have the power to accept or reject the recommendation of the fact-
finding panel. Thus, if the recommendation is unacceptable to the agency
head, there still exists the possibility that the governor may implement
them.
VI. CONCLUSION
The survey of Indiana law illustrates the need for a labor relations
act embracing public and private employees. The function of such an
act would be to assure free choice by employees and to substitute orderly
procedures for economic combat as the way of solving disputes concern-
ing representation. The type of act suggested would not be entirely satis-
factory to either labor or management but it would protect the basic in-
terests of both. On the other hand, the public, which has a strong inter-
est in industrial peace and in the fair treatment of employees, should be
well served by the establishment of procedures to safeguard employees'
free choice and to resolve disputes fairly. The most difficult question is
not whether Indiana should have a labor relations law but whether the
divergent personalities and groups which are represented in the Indiana
General Assembly are capable of reaching a consensus with respect to
such an act.
be sent to the parties and to the Governor. The settlement recommendation
shall be a matter of public record.
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